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Comment and Casenotes
SELF INCRIMINATION AND THE WAIVER THEREOF
THEODORE SHERBOW *
WAIVER BY ORDINARY WITNESS
The overwhelming weight of the decisions relating to
waiver by an ordinary witness of his privilege against in-
criminating himself is that once he discloses a fact or
transaction without invoking his privilege he waives that
privilege with respect to the details and particulars of
such fact or transaction.
The mere mention by a witness of any act or happening
while on the stand waives the privilege as to all the ele-
ments and items which are involved. He may be required
to enlighten the court as to all the factors of the affair as
well as the minutiae of the incident.
The usual rule is that ". . . If two are related facts, part
of a whole fact forming a single relevant topic, then his
waiver as to a part is a waiver as to remaining parts; be-
cause the privilege exists for the sake of the criminating
fact as a whole."'
Typical of the statements setting out the majority rule
is that of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington;
a witness who voluntarily answers an incriminating ques-
tion on direct examination without claiming his privilege
cannot refuse to answer on cross-examination questions
germane to his direct examination.' The majority's atti-
tude is that the waiver is complete and total.
The Maryland law on the point is confused because of
the early case of Roddy v. Finnegan.' This was a suit in
trespass vi et armis for assault and battery. One Curran
sold a load of hay to Finnegan which was delivered to the
street in front of Finnegan's stable. Finnegan, in the pres-
ence of Curran, gave directions to the driver to put the hay
in a window opening into the stable. Following orders,
Curran's driver drove the team on the pavement. Roddy,
a police officer of Baltimore, came on the scene and made
inquiry as to why the wagon and team were on the pave-
ment in violation of the city ordinance. Finnegan was then
* A.B., 1944, LL.B., 1947, University of Maryland.
18 WIOMOR ON EVIDENCE (3rd Ed. 1940) Sec. 2276 (b) (1).
'State v. Morgan, 151 Wash. 300, 275 P. 717 (1929).
843 Md. 490 (1876).
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arrested for the violation. This action was subsequently
brought for illegal arrest.
Finnegan appeared as a witness for himself and gave
his version of the occurrence. On cross-examination he was
asked: "When you pointed out to the witness Curran the
window through which you wished the hay put into the
stable, and told him to put it in at that window, did you
or did you not intend that the wagon and horses should be
driven on the pavement, for the purpose of putting in the
hay?"4 Upon proper objection the lower court ruled the
question inadmissible.
In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals said,
"The witness ordinarily has the privilege of declining to
answer a question that might subject him to criminal prose-
cution; but this he can waive .... Where he is both party,
and witness for himself, he must be held on his cross-
examination as waiving the privilege, as to any matter
which he has given testimony-in-chief. Having testified to
a part of the transaction in which he was concerned, he is
bound to state the whole."'
This case is a further example of the majority doctrine
of complete waiver. But nine years later the Court of
Appeals completely ignored the principles enunciated in
Roddy v. Finnegan,6 when it decided the case of Chesapeake
Club v. State.7
The defendant Club was indicted and found guilty of
violating the Local Option Law of Anne Arundel County
by unlawfully having in its possession and selling spirituous
liquors. Witness Taylor, a member of the Club, stated
without objection that he had got whiskey and beer at
the Club. The State asked if he had ever seen any liquor
there. The witness objected to answering, claiming his
answer might incriminate him, but the trial Court required
him to answer.
Chief Judge Alvey speaking for a divided court said
the witness was entitled to insist upon his privilege of
being exempt from making any disclosure that might be
used for his crimination. "Formerly it was thought that
if a witness chose to reply in part he might be compelled
to answer everything relating to the transaction. But that
doctrine has been solemnly overruled, and it is now finally
settled in the English courts that after a witness has been
sworn, he may claim his protection at any stage of the
Ibid., 500.
Ibid., 502.
6 Supra, n. 3.
7 63 Md. 446 (1885).
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inquiry, and upon his so doing he cannot be compelled to
answer any additional question that would tend to crimi-
nate him."8 For this proposition the Court cited Regina v.
Garbett0 No mention was made of Roddy v. Finnegan. No
other authority than this lone English case was put forth
to bolster the view that the majority doctrine "has been
solemnly overruled". By this slight reference to the above
mentioned case, Maryland has joined England to form the
only two jurisdictions which allow the claiming of the
privilege at any stage of the inquiry at the complete whim
of the witness.
Regina v. Garbett involved the appearance of Garbett
as a witness in a civil action between Bragdon and Booth
to which Garbett was not a party. He gave evidence
favorable to Booth, the defendant. In the course of his
testimony, he disclosed facts which tended to show that
he was involved in a forgery. The court then compelled
him over his objection, on cross-examination by counsel
for the plaintiff, to answer the direct question whether he
had committed the forgery. Later, he was put on trial
for that crime and in that criminal trial the question arose
as to the admissibility against him of his compelled answer
in the earlier civil suit. The Court said, "It made no dif-
ference in the right of the witness to protection that he
had chosen to answer in part. He was entitled to it at
whatever stage of the inquiry he chose to claim it, and
that no answer forced from him by the presiding judge
(after such claim) could be given in evidence against
him."'"
The English rule as laid down in the Garbett case has
not been changed. The present law, there, is that if the
witness "chooses to answer part of an inquiry, it does not
waive his right to object to answer subsequent questions."'"
Although the Roddy case was a civil action where the
witness in question was a party to the suit and the Chesa-
peake Club case was a criminal prosecution involving an
ordinary witness, it is not possible to distinguish the two
cases on either basis. The Court made itself much too clear
in the latter case to permit any hairline distinctions to
be drawn. The fact remains that Maryland is the only
American jurisdiction which allows a witness after he
has started to testify about the subject matter to claim pro-
tection of self-incrimination at any stage of the inquiry.
" Ibid., 457.
02 C. & K. 474, 175 Eng. Repr. 196 (1847).
Ibid., 175 Eng. Repr. 205.
" HALSBunY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (2nd Ed. 1934) 804.
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Dean Wigmore when he compiled his model code of
evidence suggested the following to cover waiver by ordi-
nary witnesses of the privilege of self-incrimination. "An
ordinary witness, by testifying, does not waive the privi-
lege; except that if he testifies to any part of a matter known
to him to be criminating, he may not afterwards during
that trial claim the privilege for any other part of the
same matter.'
12
REASONS FOR COMPLETE WAIvER DOCTRINE
The aim of the various rules of evidence promulgated
through the years is to promote justice through the finding
of the truth. In the interest of justice it would be mani-
festly unfair to allow a witness who has volunteered cer-
tain information to the court which he was not forced to
reveal to withhold the particulars of the transaction. The
witness was under no compulsion to disclose facts which
tend to incriminate him. Once he does divulge such infor-
mation, his privilege is waived and all details must be given.
If the complete waiver doctrine were not applied, it
would be possible by collusion between the witness and
the party for whom he was testifying to be certain that
only such evidence which favored their side of the case
would be revealed. By the strategic claiming of the privi-
lege by the witness, under the guise of invoking constitu-
tional rights, the opposing party would not be allowed the
full cross-examination to which he is entitled.
Common sense insists that once a witness discloses a
part of a doubtful transaction with the inherent possibili-
ties of incrimination, it is reasonable to believe that he
realizes that a full revelation of all of the facts will more
probably lead to a full incrimination. The courts must
assume that the witness has waived his privilege in its
entirety.
How WAIVR Is ExERcisE
When a witness answers a question which is put to him
by counsel without suggesting to the court that he might
be incriminating himself, the privilege is waived in its
entirety. The recital of one fact which suggests incrimina-
tion will waive the privilege concerning all other facts
revolving about the same set of circumstances.
When a witness voluntarily offers to testify fully about
the matter at issue after he has been informed of his consti-
'" WIoMoRE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (3rd Ed. 1942) 2375.
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tutional rights and where he is acting under advice of
counsel, he has waived the privilege.
The privilege is waived by the answering of questions
without objection and without attempts being made to in-
voke any constitutional right."3
WHO DECIDES IF PRIVILEGE CAN BE ExERcIsED
Final decision as to whether the privilege can be exer-
cised lies with the trial judge. It is not sufficient that the
witness in his own mind think his answer might incriminate
him. The court must be able to perceive that there is a
reasonable ground for refusal. If it appears to the trial
judge that the answer would not have the tendency claimed
by the witness, he can be compelled to answer.
"The mere statement of the witness on oath that he
believes that the answer to the question asked will tend
to criminate him will not suffice to protect him from
answering, if from all the circumstances surrounding the
case the court is satisfied that the answer will have no such
effect as that claimed by the witness. It is for the court
to decide whether the privilege is well and bona fide claimed
or not. .. ."14
As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall framed the proposition,
"When a question is propounded it belongs to the court to
consider and to decide whether any direct answer to it
can implicate the witness."' 5
The statement by the witness that the answer to be
made is incriminating is not conclusive since it is within
the province of the trial judge to make the final decision.
WHO CAN CLAIM PRIVILEGE
"This is a personal privilege of the witness, and must
be claimed by him upon oath ... and consequently neither
the party to the cause nor the counsel engaged will be per-
mitted to make the objection."' 6
WAivE By AccusED
In the case of State v. Allen, 7 Allen was convicted of
assault with intent to rape. The accused was required
while on the witness stand in his own behalf and under
cross-examination to try on a hat which had been found
'S WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (11th Ed. 1935) 1981 et seq.
1, Supra, n. 7, 456.
"U. S. v. Burr, Fed. Case No. 14, 692e (1807), 25 Fed. Cas. 's.
Supra, n. 7, 456.
"183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944).
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at the scene of the crime and which, concededly, had been
worn by the culprit.
The Court, in reversing the lower court agreed that
when the accused voluntarily takes the stand in his own
behalf he waives the privilege of self-incrimination con-
cerning any matter pertinent to the issue on trial regardless
of the extent of the direct examination, and cited Guy v.
State.18 It then said that:
"The one limitation is that he, himself, may not be
compelled to furnish or produce evidence which would
tend to connect him with the crime." 9
No authorities were referred to.
It is the last quotation which will now be examined in
the light of prior Maryland and foreign decisions.
WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY
Almost all jurisdictions have changed the common law
rule which forbade the accused to testify in his own behalf.
The applicable Maryland code section states that, "In the
trial of all indictments .. .against persons charged with
the commission of crimes and offenses .. .in any court in
this State ... the person so charged shall at his own re-
quest, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness;
but the neglect or refusal of any such person to testify
shall not create any presumption against him."2
In allowing the accused to take the stand under au-
thority of such Code sections as above, there has developed
through a long line of decisions the effect of such action
by the traverser. It waives completely his constitutional
privilege against giving self-incriminating evidence.
"When the accused voluntarily offers himself as a wit-
ness, the waiver of the witness's constitutional privilege
is complete, and when he takes the stand, his privilege is
waived in its entirety. He may accordingly, be asked ques-
tions on cross-examination which tend to incriminate him,
so long as they are material and relevant to the issues...-21
There was never any doubt that Maryland was firmly
entrenched behind the majority doctrine until the case
of State v. Allen. Guy v. State22 has been cited as majority
authority since its initial delivery.
90 Md. 29, 44 A. 997 (1899).
' Supra, n. 17, 612.
20Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 4.
" WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (11th Ed. 1935) 1984.
SSupra, n. 18,
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In the latter case the defendant was indicted for unlaw-
fully selling intoxicating liquors contrary to the Local Op-
tion law of Harford County. The accused took the stand,
of his own motion, and testified in his own behalf. Upon
cross-examination by the State, he was asked if he had a
United States license to sell liquors. The defendant ob-
jected, claiming he might incriminate himself. The lower
court overruled the objection and required the answer. In
affirming the court below, the Court of Appeals said, "And
it would seem but right that if a person so charged volun-
tarily becomes a witness in his own behalf, he should be
held to have waived the privilege and protection which
would otherwise have been afforded him . .."I The Court
cited with approval Commonwealth v. Nichols,24 to the
effect that when the accused takes the stand he can be
"cross-examined upon all facts relevant and material to
that issue, and cannot refuse to testify to any facts which
would be competent evidence in the case if proved by
other witnesses.""5 The accused may be cross-examined
concerning any matter pertinent to the issue on trial, re-
gardless of the extent of the direct examination.25
These are unequivocal words, the plain meaning of
which force a complete and total waiver instantly the ac-
cused takes the stand. There is no room in the Guy case
to allow for any such partial waiver as was allowed in
the Allen case.
Under similar factual circumstances, the Guy case has
been approved on two separate occasions by the Court of
Appeals." Neither case sought to narrow the majority doc-
trine in any way.
A situation factually similar to the Allen case was that
of Smith v. Commonwealth." The defendant was convicted
of malicious cutting with intent to kill. While she was
testifying as a witness in her own behalf, and after she
had stated she cut the prosecuting witness, the State's
Attorney presented a knife and asked her to identify it.
She did so and the knife was introduced in evidence.
On appeal the Court rejected the contention that the
lower court had erred in permitting the introduction of
the knife into evidence. "Besides having voluntarily testi-
fied that she cut Mary Braxton with a knife to protect
-Ibid., 33.
"114 Mass. 285,19 Am. Rep. 346 (1873).
Ibid., 287.
2Lawrence v. The State, 103 Md. 17, 30, 63 A. 96 (1906) ; Lansman v.
State, 142 Md. 398, 402, 121 A. 159 (1923).136 Va. 773, 118 S. E. 107 (1923).
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herself, she waived her right to object to questions con-
cerning the identity of the knife or its introduction in evi-
dence."28
The sound rule accepted in most states is that "an
accused in a criminal case, by testifying at all, waives the
privilege . . . as to all matters relevant to any part of the
issues, but not as to facts merely affecting his credibility
as a witness."2
There was no problem as to the credibility of the ac-
cused in the Allen case. The forcible trying on of the hat
was a matter relevant to the issue. The moment the de-
fendant, of his own motion, was sworn as a witness, there
was no possibility of refusal to answer any question or do
any reasonable act which had a direct bearing upon the
trial. He had waived completely his privilege of self-
incrimination.
As Mr. Justice Stone, later Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court said, "The safeguards against self-incrimination are
for the benefit of those who do not wish to become wit-
nesses in their own behalf and not for those who do. There
is a sound policy in requiring the accused who offers him-
self as a witness to do so without reservation, as does any
other witness."30
REASON FOR COMPLE WAivER DOCTRINE
There is ample logic in the majority doctrine which
requires that when the accused takes the stand his waiver
of the privilege must be complete. The defendant has been
advised of the privilege by either his counsel or by the
court and knows that he can not be forced to testify against
his will. He is cognizant of the fact that the privilege has
protected him from answering embarrassing questions. Any
question which he answers relating to the issue may be
incriminating. Therefore, when he does testify as to an
incriminating fact, his voluntary offer to do so must be
assumed to be a waiver as to all other relevant facts relat-
ing to the issue.
There is a definite distinction between the position of
a witness when he initially takes the stand and that of
the accused when he is first sworn. The ordinary witness
does not know what connection there is between the first
question asked him and any subsequent question that
might be incriminating. So that when such a question is
18 Ibid., 778, 118 S. . 109.
WIGMORE CODE OF EVIDENCE (3rd Ed. 1942) Sec. 2376.
Raffel v. U. S., 271 U. S. 494 (1926).
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asked he will be excused from answering it if it tends to
subject him to criminal prosecution. But the traverser,
when he takes the stand, knows that there must always
be a connection between the first question and subsequent
ones, all of which may incriminate him.
Therefore, when the accused testifies, he has signified
his waiver as to all facts relating to the issue by his initial
act of taking the stand."1
MINORITY VIEw
There is an extreme view exemplified by one or two
decisions which allow the privilege to be claimed by the
accused at any time after examination has commenced.
This conception virtually concedes no possibility of waiver
even though it is the defendant who voluntarily takes the
stand.
This opinion originated with Judge Cooley of Michigan,
distinguished author of many legal treatises. Speaking of
the accused taking the stand in his own behalf, he says,
"and if he does testify, he is at liberty to stop at any point
he chooses, and it must be left to the jury to give a state-
ment which he declines to make a full one, such weight as,
under the circumstances, they think it entitled to ... ""
This novel approach was called to that author's attention
while he was in the process of revising the first edition of
the work in question, but he refused to make any change
in the phraseology in spite of the fact that there were no
authorities upon which the section was based.3
Judge Cooley in a dictum applied his rule in People v.
Mead, 4 and it was this case upon which the Court in the
Allen case relied in part.
In spite of the position of leadership in which Judge
Cooley was held by the courts of his own state, it was neces-
sary for the Supreme Court of Michigan to hold conversely
to him. "Contrary to the views of that eminent author
and judge, Mr. Justice Cooley, it seems to have been
universally held that the defendant, by taking the stand
in his own behalf, thereby waives, to a certain extent at
least, his constitutional right to refuse to testify. 35 The
court allowed full cross-examination of the defendant on
the same basis as other witnesses.
z8 WIMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed. 1942) 2296 (b) (2).
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th Ed. 1927) 660.
"8 WioMonE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed. 1942) 2296 (b) (2) (f).
"50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95 (1883).
People v. Dupounce, 133 Mich. 1, 94 N. W. 388 (1903).
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By dictum the Georgia Supreme Court in an early case36
was aligned with the minority view. Speaking of self-
incrimination after the defendant has taken the stand in
his own behalf that court said, "The defendant cannot even
waive this protection; for the law is, in this regard, his
guardian." 7 But a later Georgia decision in discussing the
above said, "This case does not require us to go to the,
extreme length laid down by that last cited, and it is proper
to say that, without qualification, we cannot give our sanc-
tion to the doctrine there announced. ..."38
Dean Wigmore refers to Georgia as the only jurisdiction
which adheres to the minority view, citing Higdon v.
Heard,39 but apparently the later Georgia decision has now
placed her with the majority on this point.4"
The Allen case placed much credence in the decision
of Ward v. State41 which was considered "a well reasoned
case directly on point". In a trial for illegal manufacture
of intoxicating liquor, one of the defendants became a wit-
ness in his own behalf. The State's Attorney, on cross-
examination, handed the witness a coat found by police
officers near where the alleged crime was committed and
asked him to put it on. Counsel for the defendant objected,
but the court required the defendant to put on the coat
in the presence of the jury.
In holding that the lower court's action was prejudicial
to the defendant, the court said, "The protection offered
by the constitutional provision against self-incrimination
is peculiarly a protection to witnesses. In this case the
defendant at the time of being required to put on the coat
was a witness, and the demonstration of the fit of the
coat on the body of the defendant was required to be made
in the presence of the jury during the progress of the trial
... we think a clear distinction should be made between
the defendant as such and between the defendant as a wit-
ness. The prohibition was intended for the protection of
witnesess, and as such should receive a more liberal con-
struction in favor of witnesses."42
The Oklahoma court made no mention of the ordinary
rule that the accused waives the privilege when he testifies
for himself. The basis of the court's reasoning rests on
Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255 (1853).
Ibid., 258.
Gravett v. The State of Georgia, 74 Ga. 191, 200 (1884).
Supra, n. 36.
408 WiGmORE, EVIDEmCE (3rd Ed. 1940) 2275.
"27 Okla. Cr. 362, 228 P. 498 (1924).
Ibid., 499.
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the obvious fallacy that when the defendant takes the stand
he is in every respect to be treated as an ordinary witness.
It is well recognized that such a distinction must be made
when applying the principles of waiver to the privilege
of self-incrimination. When the defendant takes the stand,
he is sworn not only as a witness but also as the accused.
All that this oath implies immediately follows. He is in
no respect to be treated merely as an ordinary witness.
Although Ward v. State has not been specifically over-
ruled in Oklahoma, late decisions from that jurisdiction
place it with the majority.43 Speaking of the cross-exami-
nation of the defendant on the stand, the Oklahoma court
says, "His cross-examination is not confined to a mere
categorical review of the matters stated in the direct exami-
nation. He may be asked questions irrelevant and collateral
to the issue for the purpose of testing his memory, affecting
his credibility and the weight of his testimony."44 This
statement places the court in line with the decisions on the
point and extends a considerable shadow over the value
of the Ward case.
CONCLUSION
When the traverser takes the stand to testify in his
own behalf, the overwhelming weight of authority holds
that after he is sworn the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has been waived in its entirety. Historically the Mary-
land decisions have agreed with the majority doctrine.
There is a very slight body of opinion which allows the
accused to claim his privilege even after he has begun to
testify. These few cases are almost completely dictum.
They have been thoroughly discredited in the jurisdictions
of their origin. It is upon these weak decisions which the
Court of Appeals chose to base the Allen case.
Once a defendant in a criminal action voluntarily testi-
fies upon the merits before the trier of fact, he has no
privilege to refuse to disclose any matter relevant to any
issue in this action.45
43Murphy v. State, 112 P. 2d 438 (Okla. Cr. App. 1941) ; Williamson v.
State, 77 P. (2d) 1193 (Okla. Cr. App. 1938).
11 Murphy v. State, 8upra, n. 43.
'5AMELICAN LAw INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 208.
[VOL. X
